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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
LUIS A. GUZMAN, : Case No. 20040647-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner. : Petitioner is incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision in State v. Guzman, 2004 
UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302, because it erroneously holds the admission of testimony 
concerning an eyewitness5 subjective certainty of identification does not violate the due 
process clause of the Utah Constitution or rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THE ADMISSION OF 
EYEWITNESS CERTAINTY EVIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
First, the State argues this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision 
because this Court's case law has not required juries to consider certainty testimony "as a 
matter of law," but has "allowed juries to consider" it. Rspt. Br. at 11, 18. Contrary to 
the State's argument, this Court has not yet decided whether certainty testimony is 
admissible. See Order dated November 10, 2004. This Court has, however, recognized 
the danger of certainty testimony and deliberately excluded it from the list of factors a 
jury should consider when deciding the credibility of an eyewitness identification. See 
State v.Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 
(Utah 1986). Because an eyewitness9 certainty may or may not indicate accuracy and 
there is no way to decide whether a particular witness5 certainty indicates accuracy or 
inaccuracy in a particular case, this Court rejected eyewitness certainty "as an indicator of 
an identification's reliability." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; see Long, 721 P.2d at 490. 
Instead, this Court held the jury should decide credibility by considering factors that can 
actually be weighed by the jury, such as: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at 
the time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind 
of the observer during the lime it was observed, and whether 
the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490. 
By so holding, this Court purposefully diverged from federal case law and the 
jurisdictions that follow federal case law. Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (criticizing courts and 
attorneys for "comfortably rely[ing] upon settled legal precedent," and "largely ignoring] 
the teachings of other disciplines, especially when they contradict long-accepted legal 
2 
notions"): see Neil v. Biggers. 409 U.S. 188,198-99 (1972) (listing, unlike Utah, witness 
certainty as factor "to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification"); 
Jones v. State. 539 S.E.2d 143, 146-47 (Ga. 2000) (unlike Utah, following BiggersJ use 
of certainty as factor for determining reliability of identification); State v. McClendon, 
730 A.2d 1107, 1115-16 (Conn. 1999) (unlike Utah, concluding problems with 
eyewitness identifications are "general principles [that] should come as no surprise to the 
average juror"); State v. Williamson. 539 A.2d 561, 565 (Conn. 1988) (same as Jones): 
but see Rspt. Br. at 27-28 (urging this Court to follow Jones and McClendon). 
Although this Court has not specifically decided whether certainty testimony is 
admissible, its decisions in Ramirez and Long indicate that admitting certainty testimony 
would violate due process. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490. If, as 
this Court has already held, eyewitness certainty is too unreliable to be a factor for 
determining eyewitness credibility, then it should not be admitted into evidence at all 
because its very presence taints the jury's decision. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778 
(holding courts must not "leave protection of constitutional rights to the whim of a jury"). 
A "confident witness tends to make participant-jurors ignore the witnessing conditions 
themselves and believe the eyewitness at a rate that exceeds the actual rate of accuracy." 
D. P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide 
for Law Enforcement, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 231, 264 (2000) [hereinafter Judges] (citing G. L. 
Wells & A. L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses 
3 
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 361 
(1998) [hereinafter Wells & Bradfield]); see R. N. Haber & L. Haber, Experiencing, 
Remembering and Reporting Events, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 1057,1059 (2000) 
[hereinafter Haber & Haber] ("Jurors report that they find it very difficult to consider any 
alternatives to a confident statement by an eyewitness."); G. L. Wells & E. P. Seelau, 
Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 
Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 765, 773 (1995) [hereinafter Wells & Seelau] (noting witness 
confidence "is the single most powerful determinant of whether testimony observers 
believe that the eyewitness made an accurate identification" (citations omitted)); J. 
Brigham, A. Wasserman & C. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: 
Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. Rev. 1, 12 (1999) [hereinafter Brigham, 
Wasserman & Meissner] ("Eyewitness testimony, when delivered in a confident manner 
by a witness, may be more convincing to jurors than any other type of evidence."). 
Instead, this Court should require the State to extract the details and circumstances 
surrounding the identification that are necessary to prove the identification is credible 
beyond a reasonable doubt, not just credible in the eyewitness5 mind. See State v. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,^25, 48 P.3d 953 (holding eyewitness testimony must be reliable 
under "totality of the circumstances"); State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35,lffl29-64, 44 P.3d 794 
(conducting detailed analysis of identifications based on Ramirez factors); State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57,fflj42-47, 993 P.2d 837 (same), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000); 
4 
State v.Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378,1381 (Utah 1986) (same). 
As explained in Guzman's opening brief, the fact that this Court mentioned 
eyewitness certainty when analyzing Long's spontaneity and consistency factor in State 
v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265, and Hubbard, does not mean this Court has 
retreated from its strong condemnation of certainty testimony. See. Pet. Br. at 23-24. 
Neither Hoffhine nor Hubbard addressed whether certainty testimony is a factor for 
determining credibility or is admissible. See Hubbard. 2002 UT 45 at [^1 (deciding 
whether trial court erred by admitting eyewitness identifications and excluding expert on 
eyewitness identification); Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4 at J^16 (deciding whether trial court 
erred by suppressing eyewitness identification but "admitting the underlying facts" of the 
showup identification). Moreover, in Hoffhine, this Court actually restated and affirmed 
its holding that it "has specifically rejected the 'level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining the constitutional 
reliability of an identification." IcL at TJ16 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721 
P.3d at 490). As explained by Ramirez, the "relevant circumstances" for weighing 
spontaneity and consistency, rather than including certainty testimony, include 
circumstances that can actually be weighed by the jury, such as: 
the length of time that passed between the witness's 
observation at the time of the event and the identification of 
defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at 
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to 
opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information 
from other sources; instances when the witness or other 
5 
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; 
instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a 
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; 
and the circumstances under which defendant was presented 
to the witness for identification. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. 
Second, the State claims the admission of certainty testimony does not violate 
Utah's due process clause because some scientific articles claim a relationship exists 
between confidence and accuracy, science may have miscalculated this relationship, and 
this relationship might increase where good observation conditions exist. Rspt. Br. at 18-
26 (citations omitted). The State concedes, however, that certainty testimony has 
"problems" and that the correlation between confidence and accuracy, even considering 
the scientific articles it cites, is "'weak' to 'modest'" or "'medium'" at best. Rspt. Br. at 
21, 24 (quoting S. Penrod & B. Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: 
Assessing Their Forensic Relation. 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 817, 842 (1995) 
[hereinafter Penrod & Cutler]; K. Bothwell, A. Deffenbacher & J. C. Brigham, 
Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 
72 J. Applied Psychol. 4, 693 (1987)). 
Thus, the articles cited by the State do not change the fact that scientific research 
has "undermined the common notion that the confidence with which an individual makes 
an identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the recollection." Long, 721 P.2d 
at 490 (citations omitted); see also E. S. Higgins & B. S. Skinner, Establishing the 
6 
Relevance of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification: Comparing Forty 
Recent Cases with the Psychological Studies. 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 471,483 (2003) ("The 
confidence exhibited by the eyewitness at the initial identification has been shown to be 
only mildly associated with accuracy." (citation omitted)); Penrod & Cutler, 1 Psychol. 
Pub. Pol. & L. at 830 (explaining confidence is "weak indicator of eyewitness accuracy 
even when measured at the time an identification is made and under relatively 'pristine' 
laboratory conditions"); M. Kebbell & D. Giles, Some Experimental Influences of 
Lawyers' Complicated Questions on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy. 134 J. 
Psychol. 129, 136 (March 2000) (testing confidence under "confusing conditions" and 
finding witnesses "were highly confident and wrong"). 
As claimed by the State, witness confidence may, at times, indicate identification 
accuracy. Rspt. Br. at 18-23. But the fact remains that identification accuracy is also "at 
times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is made" and there is no way for a 
jury to decide whether a particular witness' certainty indicates accuracy or inaccuracy in 
a particular case. Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (citation omitted). Thus, permitting a jury to 
consider an eyewitness' certainty testimony when deciding the credibility of the 
eyewitness' identification is equivalent to permitting the jury to decide credibility based 
on intuition rather than evidence and, in many cases, that intuition is wrong. See Judges, 
53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264 ("Most people—including police, prosecutors, jurors, trial judges, 
and appellate judges—rely heavily on witness confidence as a guide to witness accuracy." 
7 
(citation omitted)); Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 25 (noting "intuitive 
beliefs usually serve us well in dealing with the world," but in the area of eyewitness 
memory, "these usually reliable beliefs are not accurate enough to ensure fair treatment 
under the law" (emphasis in original)). 
Third, the State argues that despite its "problems," certainty testimony is 
admissible because some scientific articles say a cautionary instruction or expert 
testimony is sufficient to cure the taint of certainty testimony. Rspt. Br. at 24-25 (citing 
S. L. Sporer, S. D. Penrod, J. D. Read, & B. L. Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and 
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness 
Identification Studies, 118 Psychol. Bull. 3, 315, 324 (1995) [hereinafter Sporer, Penrod, 
Read & Cutler]; J. L. Devenport, et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating 
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 338, 358 (1997) [hereinafter 
Devenport]; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 25; M. R. Leippe, The 
Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol. & L. 909, 
948 n.5 (1995) [hereinafter Leippe]). Neither a cautionary instruction nor expert 
testimony, however, can adequately cure the taint of certainty testimony. As explained in 
Guzman's opening brief, scientific research shows cautionary instructions and expert 
testimony are powerless against the overwhelming impact of certainty testimony. Pet. Br. 
at 19-20; see Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 234 (suggesting normal corrective mechanisms 
"are less than adequate to remedy the problem" of certainty testimony); Leippe, 1 
8 
Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 939 (summarizing Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter study that found 
expert testimony does not consistently eliminate effects of eyewitness confidence); S. G. 
Fox & H. A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and 
Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 Law and Hum. Behav. 3, 215-28 
(1986) (finding jurors in expert testimony conditions "continued to use eyewitness 
confidence as a guide to assessing eyewitness accuracy" and, in fact, gave more weight to 
witness confidence than jurors in no-expert conditions). 
In fact, even the articles cited by the State suggest jury instructions and expert 
testimony are not sufficient to cure the taint of certainty testimony. See Rspt. Br. at 24-
25; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 21-23 (noting "existing cautionary 
judicial instructions" are inadequate, noting purpose of expert is to provide "factually 
based frame of reference within which to interpret the eyewitness evidence," and listing 
reasons for which eyewitness expert testimony is often deemed inadmissible); Devenport, 
3 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 356 (noting expert testimony increased juror sensitivity to 
"trivial relation between eyewitness confidence and identification accuracy" from 36% to 
just 58%); Leippe, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 923, 937, 939 (explaining "instructions 
cannot be relied on to counter mistaken eyewitness identification"; studies show "belief-
enhancing effect of confidence persisted despite expert testimony"; and jurors "may not 
be able retrospectively to apply new knowledge about the nondiagnosticity of and 
behavioral correlates of confidence"); Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, 118 Psychol. Bull. 
9 
at 324 (noting "there are conflicting findings on the question of whether expert testimony 
increases sensitivity to variations in witness confidence," and in fact, "an expert may only 
compound juror reliance on confidence"). 
Besides, cautionary instructions and expert testimony on certainty testimony are 
rarely allowed. See, e.g.. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ^20 (upholding decision to exclude 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification, including certainty testimony, because it 
"'would, in fact, merely lecture the jury.5" and "would 'have a significant tendency to 
cause the jury to abdicate its role as fact finder'"); Long, 721 P.2d at 496 (Hall, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (noting Long instruction, even without certainty instruction, 
is inappropriate comment on the evidence); Long, 721 P.2d at 497 (Howe, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (noting Long instruction, even without certainty instruction, is 
inappropriate because "sheer length and detail . . . overshadows the other instructions and 
is heavily slanted in favor of the defendant"). In fact, the State itself concedes the 
certainty jury instruction contemplated in this case probably would not have been 
allowable because, according to the State, it was an "improper comment by the court on 
the evidence." Rspt. Br. at 27 n.10 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 19); cfL J.W. v. State, 2001 
UT App 208,^15 n. 4, 30 P.3d 1232 (holding argument preserved because parties argued 
evidence during closing and "any further objections or motions regarding this issue 
would have been futile"). 
Accordingly, a greater protection against the overwhelming taint of certainty 
10 
evidence, such as exclusion, is needed. Pet. Br. at 20-21; see. Haber & Haber, 6 Psychol. 
Pub. Pol. & L. at 1084 ("The negligible correlation between accuracy and confidence at 
the time of identification, and the several factors that can subsequently increase 
confidence that have no relation at all to accuracy, all suggest that this part of testimony 
should be excluded."). Excluding certainty testimony would remove nondiagnosable but 
highly influential testimony from the jury, and allow the jury to decide the case based on 
circumstances that can be adequately weighed and compared against the evidence. See 
Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264; Wells & Bradfield, 83 J. Applied Psychol, at 361; Haber 
& Haber, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 1059; Wells & Seelau, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 
773; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 12. 
Fourth, contrary to the State's argument, Guzman was prejudiced by the 
admission of Miller's certainty testimony. Rspt. Br. at 24-26, 32. As argued by the 
State, a few circumstances surrounding the identification may have increased the 
credibility of Miller's identification. Id. As explained in Guzman's opening brief, 
however, there were also numerous circumstances that decreased the credibility of her 
identification. Pet. Br. at 25-27. These circumstances included suggestive identification 
procedures and weakened perceptual abilities due to the short, violent nature of the 
encounter during which Miller was confronted by multiple strangers in her own garage, 
threatened with a loaded gun, bound, forced to lie face-down on the garage floor, and left 
so frightened that she vomited after the encounter ended. Id_; R. 253:124-67. The 
11 
admission of Miller's strong certainty testimony was harmful because it likely blinded the 
jury to all of these circumstances, good and bad alike, and caused the jury to find Miller's 
identification credible based on her own assertion of confidence rather than on the 
evidence. Pet. Br. at 25; see Penrod & Cutler, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 821-22 
(noting studies have shown jurors ignore circumstances surrounding an identification 
when witness professes high degree of certainty). Moreover, as explained in Guzman's 
opening brief, Fernandez's credibility was severely hampered by his testimony that he 
had lied about the case before in hopes of leniency and that he was still waiting to be 
sentenced in the case and was hoping to receive probation. Pet. Br. at 24; R. 254:249-61. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THE ADMISSION OF 
EYEWITNESS CERTAINTY EVIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
RULE 403 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
First, the State argues this Court should "vacate the court of appeals' treatment of 
rule 403, and refuse to consider [Guzman's] rule 403 claim" because Guzman did not 
properly preserve his rule 403 argument. Rspt. Br. at 31. Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure says f![o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This Court 
granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide two issues: (1) "Whether the admission 
of testimony concerning an eyewitness' subjective certainty of identification violates the 
due process clause of the Utah Constitution," and (2) "Whether testimony concerning an 
eyewitness' subjective certainty of identification is inadmissible under rule 403." Order 
12 
dated November 10,2004. These issues are limited and do not include the separate issue 
of whether Guzman preserved his argument that certainty evidence is inadmissible under 
rule 403. IcL Thus, this Court should only address the issues on certiorari review and 
should not address the separate issue of preservation. I&_ 
This decision is appropriate because preservation was adequately addressed 
below. In the court of appeals, Guzman argued that admitting the certainty testimony 
violated rule 403 because "the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to hear the certainty 
testimony substantially outweigh[ed] its probative value." Guzman, 2004 UT App 211 at 
1Hfl2, 32. In response, the State argued the court of appeals should not consider 
Guzman's rule 403 claim because he did not preserve the issue below or argue plain error 
on appeal. Addendum A. In its decision, the court of appeals did not individually 
address the State's preservation claim, but chose instead to reject the State's claim by 
reaching the merits of Guzman's rule 403 argument. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211 at 
11132-33; see State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996) (declining to reach 
merits of defendant's claim because he did not preserve issue for appeal); State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (same), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
If the State disagreed with the court of appeals' decision to reject its preservation 
argument and reach the merits of Guzman's rule 403 issue, then it should have filed a 
cross-petition asking this Court to review this issue. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). The 
State, however, did not file a cross-petition and, consequently, this Court did not include 
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preservation in the issues on certiorari review. See. Order dated November 10, 2004. 
There are also strong policy reasons for declining to address the State's 
preservation claim in this case. This Court does not grant certiorari to create a second 
direct appeal, but to decide the narrow issues that it itself defines. See, e.g., Salt Lake 
City v. Grotepas. 906 P.2d 890, 891 (Utah 1995) (granting "certiorari for the narrow 
purpose of reviewing the court of appeals' decision concerning1' ineffective assistance of 
counsel test); Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assfn v. Bagley & Co.. 901 P.2d 1017, 
1018 (Utah 1995) (granting "certiorari for the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of 
appeals' decision concerning" jurisdiction.). The State often challenges preservation on 
direct appeal, even in cases where the defendant has created an extensive record of the 
issue. If this Court considers the State's preservation claim in this case, even though 
preservation is not an issue on certiorari review, then this Court will invite the State to 
rehash its preservation claims in every case on certiorari. See Order dated November 10, 
2004. This will unnecessarily clutter certiorari cases with preservation issues that were 
already decided by the court of appeals and were not properly made part of the writ of 
certiorari. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). Thus, this Court should decline to review the 
court of appeals' decision on preservation. Id. Instead, it should address the issue on 
certiorari, "Whether testimony concerning an eyewitness' subjective certainty of 
identification is inadmissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Order 
dated November 10, 2004. 
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Regardless, this Court should reach the merits of the rule 403 issue because 
Guzman preserved it for appeal. Preservation exists because "the trial court ought to be 
given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 
enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . . 
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,f 11, 
10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, an issue is 
preserved if ""'it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity 
to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Rule 403 says 
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Although Guzman never said the rule 
number to the trial court, the major thrust of his argument was that the certainty evidence 
should be excluded because it was not probative of the accuracy of Miller's identification 
and was "particularly prejudicial because it reinforce[d] and exploited] juror 
misconceptions about the eyewitness process." R. 72-74; 253:19-21. The trial court 
rejected this argument and ruled the certainty evidence was admissible. R. 253:21-22. 
Second, addressing the merits of the rule 403 issue, the State argues admission of 
certainty evidence does not violate rule 403 because there is a "modest" correlation 
between witness confidence and identification accuracy. Rspt. Br. at 32 (citing Brigham, 
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Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 18). A modest correlation, however, does not 
change the fact that scientific research has "undermined the common notion that the 
confidence with which an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection,f! and, lf[i]n fact, the accuracy of an identification is, at times, 
inversely related to the confidence with which it is made." Long. 721 P.2d at 490 
(citations omitted). In other words, in one case, a witness' confidence in her 
identification will indicate accuracy, but in another case, this same confidence will 
indicate inaccuracy, and there is no way for a jury to distinguish between these cases. 
See id.; Leippe, 1 Psychol. Publ. Pol & L. at 925 (summarizing studies that found "jurors 
are unable to discriminate between" accuracy and inaccuracy using certainty testimony). 
Rather, juries will be forced to guess whether the certainty testimony at issue 
indicates accuracy or inaccuracy and, when left to guess, juries tend to place "great 
weight" on confident eyewitness identifications. Long. 721 P.2d at 490-91; Haber & 
Haber, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 1059; Leippe, 1 Psychol. Publ. Pol & L. at 928 ("At 
present, the best evidence suggests that jurors have little inherent ability to 'read5 
eyewitness accuracy. Instead, they read confidence and wrongly infer accuracy."); 
Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264 (citing Wells & Bradfield, 83 J. Applied Psychol, at 361); 
Wells & Seelau, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 773 (noting confidence "is the single most 
powerful determinant of whether testimony observers believe that the eyewitness made 
an accurate identification" (citations omitted)); Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. 
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Rev. at 12. Thus, this Court should reverse because the probative value of certainty 
testimony, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Guzman requests this Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Guzman. 2004 UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302. 
SUBMITTED this /** day of July, 2005. 
ESSTSEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
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identifications, void of elaboration, exude confidence. They would convey no less certainty 
than Claryn's statements that she was 100 percent confident in her identification.8 
E. DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT ADMISSION OF CONFIDENCE 
TESTIMONY WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL UNDER RULE 403 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in admitting Claryn's confidence 
testimony because it was unduly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. 
Brf. at 31 -32. Defendant did not argue rule 403 below, see R. 72-74,253: 11 -22, nor has he 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider defendant's rule 403 claim. See State v. Hodges, 
2002 UT 117, Tj 5, 63 P.3d 66. 
II. DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION WAS 
NEITHER WARRANTED NOR NECESSARY 
In his second claim on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 33-38, defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give his proposed accomplice instruction. See R. 78 (Addendum 
B). That proposed instruction provided: 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides 
evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with 
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's 
testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is 
Moreover, exclusion of confidence testimony would also preclude defense counsel 
from impeaching a witness based on his or her confidence level. For example, defense 
counsel here could not have impeached Claryn's identifications by pointing out that she rated 
her level of certainty in her identification of Fernando Fernandez at only 6 or 7 on a ten-point 
scale. SeeR. 253: 144. 
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